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ABSTRACT 
This paper analyzes the impact of globalization on the exit behavior of manufacturing 
firms in one of the world’s most open economies: Belgium. We find that imports from 
low-wage countries exert a strong competitive effect that lowers a firm’s chances of 
survival. This competitive effect is found to arise mainly in industries where intra-
industry trade, an indicator of product differentiation, is relatively low. As an 
offensive strategy to cope with the rising competitive pressure from imports, we find 
that firms exploiting opportunities afforded by globalization, in particular the off-
shoring of activities, are able to improve their chances of survival. Making a 
distinction between domestic firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms, we also 
find that domestic firms face a higher risk of exit when multinational firms compete in 
their relevant input and output markets. Finally, we show that subsidiaries of 
multinational firms are better adapted to cope with globalization forces, and we find 
them to be less sensitive to domestic market conditions in the host country.  
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1.INTRODUCTION 
The impact of globalization on the behavior of firms and industries in 
industrialized countries has received increasing interest in the literature. Recent 
theoretical and empirical models that examine the link between industry development 
and trade liberalization show that the competitive pressures of globalization is felt 
differently across heterogeneous firms in the industry (Head and Ries, 1999; Tybout, 
2001; Pavcnik, 2002; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003a; Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 
2006b). As a result of the reallocation of resources, more productive firms expand 
while less productive firms contract or exit from the market. Summarizing recent 
theoretical models about falling trade costs and industry restructuring, Bernard, Jensen 
and Schott (2003, 2006b) point out that all the different models consistently predict 
that as trade costs fall and imports rise, less productive firms will exit the industry, 
while more productive firms will enter or increase their participation in export 
markets. Interestingly, these models also predict that even if exporting itself does not 
enhance productivity, exporting firms are less likely to exit. Blalock and Gertler 
(2004), De Loecker (2004) and Van Biesebroeck (2005) show that exporting to other 
countries may also involve an important learning process and yield substantial 
productivity gains that increase the chances of firm survival in globalizing industries.  
Some observers have noted the growing complexity of global trade flows, 
reflecting the globalization of firms’ value chains or supply chains that are organized 
into globally spread production networks (OECD, 2006). A rapidly increasing number 
of firms are reacting to growing global competitive pressures by sourcing intermediate 
inputs and activities internationally. Such international sourcing (off-shoring) can 
involve sourcing inputs through arms-length relationships between independent firms 
(out-sourcing) or within the own production network of the firm (in-sourcing). As a 
consequence of such developments, multinational firms have gained new competitive 
advantages from their flexibility to change the source of finished and intermediate 
goods and services across borders. However, the competitive advantages of 
multinational firms stretch far beyond their geographical flexibility. Their growing 
importance is linked to the possession and development of a range of knowledge 
assets, such as intellectual property, marketing and organizational skills, that allow 
them to exploit profitable opportunities in foreign markets by investing in new 
facilities abroad or by acquiring existing foreign companies.  
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This “multinationalization” process has been greatly facilitated by the removal 
of trade and investment barriers negotiated within the scope of the World Trade 
Organization (Bowen and Sleuwaegen, 2004).  
 The growing penetration of industries by multinational firms has several 
impacts on industry dynamics in host countries. In the short run, they create more 
competition for domestic firms not only in final product markets, but also in crowding 
out or more precisely, competing out, local firms in labor and other input markets (De 
Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2003b). In the longer run they create growth possibilities by 
bringing in capital and technology, linking up with domestic firms, and in generating 
technological spillovers to local firms. 
The foregoing arguments imply that the impact of the globalization process on 
the development of industries in a particular country depends strongly on the 
organization and performance of indigenous firms. Importantly, they suggest that 
firms are not confined to being passive or defensive in the globalization process, but 
can offensively take advantage of the new opportunities offered by the emergence of 
global supply and knowledge networks. In this paper we follow this route in the 
development of an empirical model to explain the exit of firms in globalizing 
industries. The paper offers three main contributions. First, we present evidence of 
how international sourcing of firms positively affects their chances of survival. In 
doing so, we underscore the importance of firm-specific importing behavior when 
examining the impact of industry-wide import penetration on failure risk. Second, we 
show how the growing penetration by multinational firms in the relevant input and 
output markets of domestic firms raises competition and increases the likelihood of 
exit by domestic firms. Third, we show that subsidiaries of multinational firms are 
structurally better adapted to cope with globalization forces. As the relevant market 
for multinational firms typically stretches across national borders, we also find these 
firms to be less sensitive to domestic market conditions in the host country. The 
empirical evidence we present relates to Belgium, one of the most open economies of 
the world, characterized by strong inflows of foreign direct investment and trade 
openness.  
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
main hypotheses. Section 3 presents the statistical model and data. Section 4 interprets 
the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. HYPOTHESES 
In a recent study Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a) find that plant survival 
and growth in U.S. manufacturing industries in the period from 1977 to 1997 were 
negatively associated with an industry’s exposure to imports, especially imports 
originating from low-wage countries (LWC). They also show that surviving firms 
adjusted their product mix and reallocated manufacturing activities towards capital-
intensive plants. The last strategy illustrates a possible offensive strategy at the 
individual firm level to deal with the rising competitive pressure from LWC imports. 
The change in activity mix, however, appears often to be part of a broader strategy by 
firms that involves moving labor-intensive production to low-wage countries and 
importing back those goods and services for further processing or distribution (OECD, 
2006). Large multinational firms that have built up extensive worldwide networks are 
in a privileged position to benefit from such sourcing strategies, and to spread their 
global value chains in the most optimal way (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 1994).  
Typically the least efficient or most costly stages of production are outsourced 
to third parties abroad. However, recent trends in off-shoring show that the process is 
not confined to the relocation of standardized labor-intensive activities, but involve 
the optimal spreading of all kinds of activities including various knowledge-intensive 
service activities within the development of global supply chains by firms 
(Yamawaki, 2004). A domestic firm facing high (sunk) costs to set up manufacturing 
plants abroad can benefit from the same international factor price differences through 
contracting or partnering with independent firms abroad. Firms that outsource not 
only benefit from lower input prices abroad, but can also benefit from better worker 
skills than they find at home (Bajpaj, Sachs, Arora and Khurana, 2004). Econometric 
studies focusing on productivity gains resulting from outsourcing activities show that 
the net effect of off-shoring on productivity depends very much on the specific 
context and stage of development of the firm (Olsen, 2006).  
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Evidence from a large set of industrialized countries shows that the in-
sourcing and out-sourcing activities of firms have risen significantly over the last 
decade and have led to substantial cost savings and quality improvements of the 
supply process of off-shoring firms (OECD, 2006). Given the growing strategic 
importance of off-shoring and the competitive advantages it offers to participating 
firms, we therefore posit 
 
H1 : International (out)sourcing lowers the probability of exit.  
 
Most studies that examine for links between globalization and industry 
dynamics focus on the exit (or its mirror image, survival) of firms in relation to 
international trade. Less attention has been paid to the impact of foreign direct 
investment (FDI), the major component of the current globalization wave, on the exit 
behavior of domestic firms. In cases where multinational firms create or serve new 
markets they may offer (through vertical linkages) new growth possibilities for 
domestic firms. The transfer of superior technology to the host country by 
multinational firms may also generate beneficial effects for domestic firms if the 
technology from multinational firms spills over to domestic firms and improves their 
efficiency (Blomstrom and Kokko, 1998; Görg and Strobl, 2003b). However, since 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) are able to transfer better technologies to host 
countries and add capacity to the industry they also increase the competitive pressure 
on domestic firms. Competitive pressure can come via the labor market when MNEs 
pay higher wages and hence make it more difficult for domestic firms to attract 
workers and discourage domestic entrepreneurship (De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 
2003b). Competitive pressure also comes via the product market where less efficient 
firms with inferior technologies are eventually pushed out of the market (Aitken and 
Harrison, 1999). The net effect from an increased participation by MNEs will 
therefore depend on the relative importance of positive spillover effects versus 
competitive displacement effects.  
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Görg and Strobl (2003b) demonstrate theoretically that positive spillover 
effects may outweigh the negative effects of crowding out on domestic firms if 
domestic firms have the capacity to absorb such spillover effects. In the model we 
separate spillover effects from competitive effects by explicitly controlling for 
productivity gains and market prospects for domestic firms and focus on the 
competitive effects, for which we posit  
 
H2: The competitive effect following an increase in the penetration of 
multinational firms in an industry raises the probability of exit by domestic 
firms.  
 
The previous arguments and hypothesis suggest several distinguishing 
characteristics of subsidiaries of MNE in host countries. First, to compensate for the 
higher costs associated with the liability of being foreign in a host country, the 
subsidiaries of multinational firms should evidence higher productivity than domestic 
firms. A growing number of studies examining the performance of MNE subsidiaries 
in different host countries, support this expectation (Globerman et al, 1994; Doms and 
Jensen, 1998; Hallward-Driemeier et al, 2002; Kimura and Kiyoyta, 2007). Second, as 
multinational firms enter new host markets and spread their activities worldwide, 
subsidiaries of multinational firms should be more involved in exporting and 
international sourcing than domestic firms. This second characteristic can be expected 
to have also an impact on the pattern of exit behavior of domestic versus subsidiaries 
of multinational firms (see for instance, Mata and Portugal, 2002; Görg and Strobl, 
2003a). Subsidiaries of multinational firms are typically less rooted in the local 
economy and, as a result, may be quicker to close down production plants (Alvarez 
and Görg, 2005). In most cases their scope of operations is also much wider than the 
national market while their production network includes operations in many 
developed and developing countries. Exit may thus result from strategic changes and 
efficiency-seeking motives within larger supply networks, rather than from simple 
profit and cost considerations solely based on market conditions in one country. For 
example, Belderbos and Zou (2006) found that divestment by Japanese multinational 
firms in the electronics industry were interlinked across countries.  
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Following this logic, we expect that subsidiaries of multinational firms will be 
less sensitive to local demand and competitive conditions and will be better adapted to 
relative cost conditions prevailing in the host country.  
Similarly, multinational firms gain competitiveness from having operating 
flexibility with respect to global supply networks. This involves cost arbitrage across 
many countries, not just sourcing from low-wage countries (Kogut and Kulatilaka, 
1994; Yamawaki, 2004) but also from other industrialized countries where they may 
benefit from scale or agglomeration economies. Indeed, Pennings and Sleuwaegen 
(2006) found that the majority of relocations by multinational firms out of Belgium 
involved shifting production to other EU countries so as to optimize production on an 
EU-wide basis. Hence,  
 
H3: Subsidiaries of multinational firms are strategically and structurally better 
adapted to industry globalization. They show a better fit with the comparative 
advantages of the host country and are less sensitive to local demand and 
competitive conditions. 
 
 
3. EXIT MODEL AND DATA 
Exit in Belgian manufacturing 
Belgium is a particularly relevant country for studying the exit of firms in 
response to the competitive pressures arising from industry globalization. The export 
rate of Belgium, defined as total exports divided by gross domestic product, rose to 
88.5 % in 2002 while the import rate rose to 78.6%. In 2002, the share represented by 
subsidiaries of multinational firms in manufacturing employment slightly exceeded 
50% while their share of value added was estimated to equal 60%. The 
internationalization of the Belgian economy over the last thirty years went hand in 
hand with a strong process of de-industrialization, i.e. declining employment in 
manufacturing sectors. Over the period 1970-2002, Belgium experienced the strongest 
decline in manufacturing employment in Europe.  
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Total employment in Belgian manufacturing in 2002 decreased to almost one 
half1 of its level in 1970 (index value 100 on the vertical axis in Figure 1).  
Insert Figure 1 About Here 
Interestingly, over the same period, Belgium attracted a strong inflow of 
foreign direct investments. Figure 1 shows that especially since the mid-1980s, the 
growth rate of foreign investment flows into Belgium has increased more rapidly than 
the growth rate of GDP. Imports also grew at a higher rate as shown by the rising 
import intensity (imports divided by total production) over the relevant period.  
Underlying the de-industrialization process depicted in Figure 1 is the exit of 
many firms from the manufacturing sector. In this paper we focus on the exits of 
domestic firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms that happened in the 
manufacturing sector of Belgium over the period 1999-2001. Exits are measured as 
firms that stopped reporting activity and were removed from the registry of companies 
published by the National Bank of Belgium2. Removal from the registry of companies 
means that a firm no longer operates as a commercial unit. Operationally, this 
excludes all cases of merger and acquisition, which are most often recorded as a 
change of ownership without any change in the VAT registration number (see e.g. 
Sleuwaegen and Dehandschutter, 1991; Van de Gucht, Konings and Roodhooft, 2000 
for an earlier use of this exit measure and discussion of its validity).  
Between 1999 and 2001, 3577 domestic firms exited the market; this 
represents 25% of all domestic firms active in 1998. As a result of these exits, 
employment in domestic firms declined by 16% over the same period. Over the same 
time period, 152 subsidiaries of multinational firms exited, equal to 10% of all 
subsidiaries active in 1998, and these exits represented a loss of 6% of MNE 
employment in Belgian manufacturing. It is also important to stress here that the unit 
of observation is the firm and not a production plant.  
                                                 
 
1
 For most of the European countries the decrease in manufacturing employment was only one third 
over the same period. 
2
 To be on the safe side in computing life-spans, we performed additional controls before classifying 
the absence of report as a firm exit. We required that a firm be absent from the file for at least 2 years in 
In order to be classified as an exit. For this reason, in our subsequent analysis we used data only until 
2001, although our data files go up to the year 2002. 
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However, very few firms (less than 5%) operate several plants in the small 
economy of Belgium. This means that our results are therefore comparable to those 
studies in which the unit of observation is the production plant. 
 
Modeling the decision to exit. 
Similar to Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a), we model the likelihood that a 
firm will exit its industry using a Logit specification:  
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In this expression, 1=iy  if firm i exits, β is a vector of coefficients, 'x  is the 
vector of explanatory variables listed in Table 1. The dependent variable equals one if 
a firm active in 1998 exited the market by 2001. We use the discrete Logit model to 
model exit instead of using a continuous year to year hazard (survival) model for two 
reasons. First, the firm-level data before 1996 were not available so 19963 does not 
correspond to the year in which each firm first entered its industry. Second, the data 
only cover a period of 5 years and so a life-table that would reflect the distribution of 
survival times is rather limited, and would contain many censored observations. In 
addition, using year to year fluctuations is also likely to increase measurement error in 
the dependent variable while some independent variables may show insufficient 
variation over the short time period or have a delayed impact on the exit decision 
which would require the inclusion of various adjustment lags (Alvarez and Görg, 
2005).  
Insert Table 1 About Here 
                                                 
 
3
 Since most of the explanatory variables included in the model are lagged for the period preceding the 
exit period, exit is studied from 1998.   
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Our model of firm exit extends the basic specification of Bernard, Jensen and 
Schott (2006a) to incorporate the specific hypotheses formulated in Section 2. The 
model controls for industry wide effects as well as for firm-specific variables that may 
account for heterogeneous responses in exit behavior. Industries are defined at the 
(European industry classification) NACE 3-digit level (Eurostat, 2002) which 
corresponds to a level of disaggregation that lies between that of the ISIC 3-digit and 
ISIC 4-digit industry definitions. By reasonably assuming a lagged adjustment, all 
explanatory industry variables included in the model are measured for the period 
1996-1998, the time period preceding the exit testing period. The descriptive statistics 
for industry variables are reported in Table 2.  
Insert Table 2 About Here 
Table 3 reports the firm level data, making a distinction between domestic 
firms and subsidiaries of multinational firms.  
Insert Table 3 About Here 
Tables A1, A2 and A3 in Appendix A present the correlations between the 
different variables. In the presentation of the variables below, we group the different 
variables according to their basic source of impact.  
 
Import competition  
Import competition (IMPGROW) is measured as the growth of import 
penetration in the three years prior to the decision to exit. The variable is measured as 
the percentage growth in the ratio of total imports to total sales in an industry. Similar 
to Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a), a distinction is made between growth in 
imports from low-wage countries (IMPGROW-L) versus growth in imports from 
other countries (IMPGROW-H). The descriptive statistics in Table 2 show that the 
growth of imports from low-wage countries in the period 1996-1998 was about 5 
times higher than the growth of imports from other countries.  
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International sourcing  
The importance of international sourcing is the central focus of our first 
hypothesis. International sourcing (SOURC) is measured by a dummy variable 
indicating if a firm imports goods and services from abroad. The available data did 
not permit us to make the same distinction between sourcing from low-wage versus 
high-wage countries as done for the import competition variable. However, for each 
firm we could differentiate whether it sourced from non-EU countries (SOURCEX). 
Clearly, if the distinction between sourcing from low-wage countries versus high-
wage countries matters, we would expect the effect to show up for the more broadly 
defined non-EU sourcing variable. 
 
Multinational penetration  
The presence of multinational firms in the industry is the subject of our second 
and third hypothesis. Multinational enterprise penetration (MNEPEN) is measured as 
the percentage growth in sales of subsidiaries of multinational firms in an industry. In 
classifying firms as subsidiaries of multinational firms we followed the UN definition 
(United Nations World Investment Report, 2002) that a subsidiary should at least be 
10% owned by a parent company that has manufacturing activities in at least two 
countries.  
 
 
Productivity, Size, Export and Capital-intensity 
The theoretical and empirical models of industry evolution consistently predict 
that under growing global competition less productive firms will exit, while 
productive firms will grow (for a recent review, see Bernard and Jensen, 2006). To 
account for difference in firm productivity we calculated the logarithm of a Total 
Factor Productivity index (TFP) for each individual firm following the method 
proposed by Caves, Christensen and Diewert (1982) and used in a comparative 
industry context by Aw, Chung and Roberts (2003). The method is described in 
Appendix B.  
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Most exit studies have found that large firms that enjoy scale economies, are 
characterized by important sunk costs and which benefit from a more varied set of 
experienced resources to be in a stronger position to face increased competition and 
resist bankruptcy (Siegfried and Evans, 1994) than are small firms. We measure firm 
size (SIZE) as the logarithm of a firm’s reported number of employees. 
Following recent work on firm heterogeneity and trade, we expect productive 
firms and large firms to export to other countries (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 2006b). 
Despite the fact that we control for size and productivity, we also included an export 
variable to control for the possibility that exporting may offer extra advantages (e.g., 
learning) to the firm, helping it to survive. Exporting (EXP) is captured by a dummy 
variable that indicates if a firm exports.  
Within the current wave of globalization, differences in factor conditions 
across countries continue to play an important role in determining the attractiveness of 
countries for locating technologically distinguished activities (Kogut, 1985). Belgium 
has established a comparative advantage in capital-intensive activities (Tharakan and 
Waelbroeck, 1988; De Backer and Sleuwaegen, 2001). Labor costs in Belgium are 
among the highest in the world (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2006). We therefore 
expect capital-intensive firms in Belgium facing growing international competition to 
show a lower probability to exit. Capital-intensity (CAPINT) of the firm is measured 
by the logarithm of the ratio of (the value of) a firm’s tangible fixed assets to it level 
of employment.  
 
Firm History: Firm Age and Downsizing 
It has been argued from an evolutionary perspective that old and large firms 
with routine business models are less likely than young and small firms to exit an 
industry. This is supported in many studies on new firm survival (Mitchell, 1994; 
Mata and Portugal, 1994; Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson, 1989). We control for this 
experience effect by including the age of the firm (AGE) and the squared value of age 
(AGE2). AGE is measured as the number of years the firm has been active in the 
industry. For subsidiaries of multinational firms this means the period since they were 
first established in Belgium. 
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In adopting the evolutionary approach we should, however, not overlook the 
fact that in some industries the economic context drastically changes over time and 
may render the business models of older firms obsolete. In reaction large firms in 
financial distress often try to become more cost efficient through downsizing and 
laying off employees (Coucke, Pennings and Sleuwaegen, 2005). However, if firms 
cannot successfully adapt their business model and are unable to become more cost 
efficient through downsizing, the decline in their employment is only a postponement 
of the exit decision, and it increases the probability of exit at a later time. Downsizing 
(DOWNS) in the model is modeled as the percentage decline in the number of 
employees in the three years preceding the exit period, reflecting a firm’s recent 
history of downsizing. 
 
Industry growth and recent Entry  
An important industry characteristic that affects the survival of firms is the 
growth of the industry, reflecting the need for extra capacity. Several authors (Caves, 
1998; Schmalensee, 1989) have also showed that profits are in general larger in 
growing than in declining industries. A positive and significant effect of industry 
growth on the survival of new firms is found in most of the empirical studies on exit, 
including Mata and Portugal (1994), Audretsch and Mahmood (1995) and Görg and 
Strobl (2003b). Industry growth (INDGROW) is measured by the relative growth in 
sales in a given NACE 3-digit industry over the period 1996-1998 (three years before 
the exit interval). 
Controlling for industry growth prospects, other studies have also reported a 
strong correlation between the flows of entry and exit across markets (Dunne, Roberts 
and Samuelson, 1988; Siegfried and Evans, 1994; Mata and Portugal, 1994). A recent 
interpretation of this positive relation between entry and exit rates is provided by the 
carrying capacity model that includes replacement and displacement entry (Geroski, 
1995; Carree and Thurik, 1999). If not just for replacing firms, new entry often 
introduces improved technologies or new products and displaces established firms 
from the industry. Hence, recent entry of new firms can be expected to increase the 
probability of exit of established firms. Industry entry (ENTRY) is measured by the 
ratio of new firms to the number of active firms in an industry averaged over the three 
years before the exit decision period.  
16 
 
4. RESULTS 
Exit Behavior of Domestic Firms 
Table 4 reports the estimation results including the marginal effects of the 
explanatory variables on the probability of exit of domestic firms for the observation 
period.  
Insert Table 4 About Here 
The positive and significant marginal effect of IMPGROW in the first column 
of Table 4 corroborates the results found for the U.S. (Bernard, Jensen and Schott, 
2006a). In industries characterized by a strong import growth relative to sales, 
domestic firms experience fierce international competition and are more likely to exit. 
In splitting up imports according to the region of origin in column 2, we find this 
effect to originate exclusively from imports from low-wage countries.  
The negative and significant coefficient of SOURC provides support for our 
first hypothesis. Domestic firms with international outsourcing activities have a lower 
probability to exit. If domestic firms can outsource abroad they can gain from 
differences in international factor prices, similar to the sourcing activities of 
multinational firms. However, during our sample period only 28 percent of the 
domestic firms engaged in international outsourcing (cf. Table 3). To the extent that 
import competition mainly originates from low-wage countries we would expect that 
outsourcing to firms located in non-EU would have a larger impact than sourcing 
from parties within the EU. Indeed, the results in column 2 where the distinction is 
made between sourcing from EU and non-EU countries4 points to this effect.  
                                                 
 
4
 We are grateful to a referee for suggesting us to split up the sourcing variable following the region of 
origin.  
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In line with our second hypothesis, multinational penetration (MNEPEN) in 
the domestic market, measured as relative growth in sales of multinational firms in the 
industry, has a significant positive coefficient suggesting a strong competitive and 
displacement effect of multinational firms. In a set of related papers, Görg and Strobl 
(2002, 2003b) present evidence for the expanding manufacturing sector in Ireland, 
including many high-tech industries, where they make a similar distinction between 
domestic and foreign firms and find positive spillovers to be more important than 
displacement effects. However, in the mature and de-industrializing economy of 
Belgium we find a strong concentration of multinational firms in traditional industries. 
In a related study focusing on technology transfers among firms, Veugelers and 
Cassiman (2004) found no evidence of strong spillover effects running from 
multinational firms to domestic firms. Moreover by including the variables for Total 
Factor Productivity as well as recent industry growth, positive spillover effects in 
terms of efficiency and /or demand are implicitly taken in account in our model so 
that MNEPEN mainly proxies for competitive effects.  
The coefficient on the productivity variable (TFP) is significant and negative 
as expected. Less productive firms are more likely to exit. The coefficient on SIZE 
suggests a strong negative impact, indicating that larger firms enjoying scale 
economies are less likely to exit. The negative and significant coefficient on CAPINT 
is consistent with the comparative advantage capital-intensive firms enjoy in Belgium. 
As a result of the high wage costs, Belgian firms are forced to substitute capital for 
labor in order to survive.  
 The results for AGE and AGE2 indicate that age has a negative dampening 
effect on the probability of exit, indicating that younger and less experienced domestic 
firms are more likely to exit. However, also for older and larger firms an employee 
lay-off in the recent history of the firm, measured by the variable DOWNS, has a 
positive and significant impact on the likelihood of exit. This result is in line with the 
finding that downsizing operations are difficult and risky operations that enhance the 
probability of exit in subsequent periods (Hannan and Carroll, 1992). Exit occurs 
when the restructuring fails to generate sufficient profits (Coucke, Pennings and 
Sleuwaegen, 2005). 
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The coefficient estimates for each of the industry characteristics have the 
expected signs: firms are less likely to exit the higher the industry’s growth, 
INDGROW, and the lower recent entry into the industry, ENTRY, suggesting an 
important displacement effect by younger successful firms.  
We do not find a negative effect for the export variable EXP. Only when we 
exclude the other globalization variables from the model (excluding MNEPEN, 
SOURC, SOURCEX, IMPGROW-L, IMPGROW-H: see column 4 of Table 4) the 
coefficient on EXP becomes negative and significant. Consistent with the findings of 
Bowen and Wiersema (2005), this finding suggests that exporting has an 
encompassing role for other globalization variables in the restricted model suggesting 
that firms react to rising global competitive pressure in such a way that surviving 
firms turn into exporting firms or enlarge their export markets. However, exporting 
itself does not appear to have a separate influence on the probability to exit. This 
result is also in line with the finding of Arnold and Hussinger (2005) who could not 
identify learning effects from exporting on productivity improvements of German 
manufacturing firms in the period 1992-2000.  
In checking the robustness of some of our findings, we tested if the results 
were sensitive to the import measure used. One particular concern related to the nature 
of imports, is that not all imports necessarily exercise the same disciplinary effect. In 
cases where industry imports comprise important intra-firm trade arising from global 
sourcing, or that concerns trade in differentiated goods, we may expect the 
disciplinary effect to be substantially smaller. The combination of scale economies 
and product differentiation may lead to substantial intra-industry trade, i.e. cross-
border trade in the same industry (Lancaster, 1980; Krugman, 1981; Helpman, 1987; 
Bergstrand, 1990). While also in this case, trade liberalization may reduce the number 
of varieties (Yeaple, 2005), the advantages of successfully differentiating one’s 
products may reduce the risk of exit. Product differentiation in combination with scale 
economies can also be seen as an important barrier to exit as successful differentiation 
most often results from sunk investments in R&D or advertising, or specific capital 
equipment (Sutton, 1991; Geroski, 1995). We consequently tested if the pressure from 
low-wage country imports is different for firms that operate in differentiated 
industries characterized by a high level of intra-industry trade. A standard method to 
measure intra-industry trade (IIT) by industry is the Grubel-Lloyd index (1975).  
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The Grubel-Lloyd index measures the share of imports or exports (whichever 
is smallest) that is ‘covered’ by exports and imports of similar types of goods. The 
index ranges from zero to one where an index of one reflects 100% intra-industry 
trade. The Grubel-Lloyd index at a NACE-3 digit industry level (Marvel and Ray, 
1987) is defined as follows: 
 
IIT= 2min (Xi , Mi)/(Xi + Mi) 
 
where Xi equals total exports in industry i and Mi total imports in industry i 
averaged over the three years preceding the exit interval. The measure also picks up 
two-way intra-firm trade following international sourcing, if the trade covers goods in 
the same industry, but less so if the sourcing covers the exchange of goods in 
vertically distinguished industries. To test the impact of intra-industry trade, we 
estimated the possible differential impact of import growth from low-wage countries 
for two distinguished cases. IMPGROW-L-D tests the impact of import growth from 
low-wage countries for strongly differentiated industries, and where intra-industry 
trade represents more than 75% of total trade of the industry. Conversely, 
IMPGROW-L-U tests the impact of import growth from low-wage countries for the 
other less differentiated industries. Industries where product differentiation is 
important can offer firms various possibilities to reorganize value chains and focus in 
high-wage countries on the skill-intensive and capital-intensive parts of the supply 
chain. We believe that this effect could partly pick up the product mix effect found in 
Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a), where they find firms heavily exposed to low-
wage country imports switch production to capital-intensive activities and industries.  
The results presented in column 3 of Table 4 point indeed at the importance of 
distinguishing between the two types of industries. We find the competitive effect 
from low-wage country imports to be exclusively captured by the less differentiated 
industries.  
Finally, in order to test for the robustness of our results across time periods, we 
performed extra tests and estimated the Logit model over two sub-periods (1998-
2000) and (1999-2001). We could not discern significant differences using a Wald-
test with respect to all model coefficients.  
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The Wald-test yielded a 2χ value of 2.38 with fourteen degrees of freedom, 
indicating no significant difference at conventional levels between the two sub-
periods. We also investigated the sensitivity of our results to changes of the 
productivity measure, as the exact measurement of total factor productivity continues 
to stir a lot of debate (see e.g. De Loeker, 2004). Using cross-section input elasticity 
estimates of a Cobb Douglas production function, the results did not significantly 
differ from the firm-specific input elasticity measures we have used. 
 
Exit Behavior of MNE subsidiaries  
 
Over the period 1999-2001 the exit rate of subsidiaries of multinational firms 
is much smaller than for domestic firms, respectively 10% of MNE subsidiaries in 
1998 versus 25 % for all domestic firms operating in 1998. A basic explanation for 
this difference that also offers support for our third hypothesis, follows from the 
descriptive statistics in Table 3. The statistics reveal statistically significant 
differences in means between domestic firms and MNE subsidiaries, with the latter 
group of firms having a higher total factor productivity, a larger size, a higher 
percentage of off-shoring and exporting subsidiaries, and a substantially higher 
capital/labor ratio compared to domestic firms. Similar results were found for plants 
belonging to multi-plant and multinational companies in U.S. manufacturing (Bernard 
and Jensen, 2006).  
As a further test of hypothesis 3, we estimated our Logit model for the exit 
behavior of subsidiaries of multinational firms, similar to the model used for domestic 
firms. Since the relevant markets and competitive arena for most multinational firms 
is typically larger than the market of a particular host country, we expected the 
competitive pressure from local entrants and the growth of the local industry to be less 
relevant for MNE subsidiaries. The results in Table 5 support this hypothesis.  
Insert Table 5 About Here 
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The entry variable and the local industry growth variable have no significant 
impact on exit, different from the results obtained for domestic firms. Using a Wald-
test for the differences between the coefficients on these two variables with respect to 
domestic versus multinational firms, resulted in a 2χ value of 6.75 with one degree of 
freedom, suggesting a significant difference in the influence of these two domestic 
variables between the two groups of firms.  
In the same context, it is interesting to find that subsidiaries of multinational 
firms show a different reaction with respect to sourcing. International sourcing 
activities of subsidiaries have a significant and strong negative impact on the 
probability to exit, irrespective of the country where the firm sources. This result 
suggests that multinational firms use their complete network to optimize a wider set of 
activities dispersed across high-wage and low-wage countries. Moreover, sourcing 
goods from affiliated plants located in high-wage countries may involve processed 
goods originally coming from low-wage countries. More importantly, the results 
continue to stress the importance of international sourcing as a strategy to survive. 
Subsidiaries that are not sourcing abroad are more vulnerable to possible exit. 
However, different from domestic firms, only 16% of the subsidiaries had no 
international sourcing activities. In some heavily regulated industries, international 
sourcing is made difficult and multinational firms cannot fully benefit from their 
operating flexibility. The fact that to survive, multinational firms have to co-ordinate 
their production activities in the most cost efficient way through global sourcing can 
also explain the increased importance of vertical FDI (versus horizontal FDI) during 
the last two decades (see e.g. Hanson, Mataloni and Slaughter, 2001). 
Import growth has a strong positive impact on the probability to exit. We find 
a stronger reaction to imports from low-wage countries in less differentiated 
industries. The estimated marginal effect of other imports tends to remain important, 
but the estimated standard deviation of the effect is large. Different from domestic 
firms, the growing presence of multinational firms does not exert a competitive 
pressure on subsidiaries to exit. On the contrary, if anything, the (insignificant) 
negative effect rather suggests cluster advantages for those firms operating in the 
globalizing industries. Together with the differential impact of imports and sourcing, 
the last results appear to indicate a different regime of the model for MNE subsidiaries 
compared to domestic firms.  
22 
 
A Wald-test of the joint difference in globalization effects for subsidiaries of 
multinational firms versus domestic firms gives a 2χ value of 18.69 with six degrees 
of freedom, rejecting the null hypothesis of no difference.  
As for domestic firms, total factor productivity continues to be an important 
determinant of exit risk. Controlling for this effect as well as those stemming from 
imports and sourcing, exporting does again not play a role on itself.  Unlike for 
domestic firms, the age variable does not show up as relevant for MNE subsidiaries, 
suggesting that subsidiaries of multinational firms are not subject to the same 
selection process as domestic firms. We would indeed expect the age of the parent 
company to be more relevant in this context. The insignificant result could also 
suggest that local experience, as measured by the time since the first establishment in 
the country, is less important or of a different nature for subsidiaries. There is a clear 
need for further research to uncover more of this process.  
The insignificant effect for size is striking. In looking at the descriptive 
statistics of Table 3, however, we find MNE subsidiaries to operate on a larger scale 
than domestic firms with little variation in size across subsidiaries. This again 
suggests that MNE subsidiaries are exploiting scale economies better than domestic 
firms. Acknowledging the strategic importance of scale economies in globalizing 
industries, MNE subsidiaries are therefore better positioned than domestic firms in 
those industries. The same observations hold for the capital-intensity variable with 
subsidiaries operating in a more capital-intensive way then domestic firms. Parallel to 
the findings for domestic firms, we also find downsizing in the recent past to increase 
the probability of exit, reflecting the high risk of using such restructuring operations to 
redress a lack of profitability. In an important number of cases, the downsizing of 
MNE subsidiaries involved the relocation of some of the operations to other countries.  
Finally, similar to the robustness checks for domestic firms, in splitting up our 
sample for different sub-periods or using an alternative measurement of total factor 
productivity, we found the results to remain robust across the different estimations of 
the model.  
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
The globalization of industries results from the interaction of diverse strategic 
actions and reactions of firms in response to new trade and investment opportunities 
across the world. Within this process, firms based in developed countries do not only 
face competition from newly industrializing countries, but increasingly seize 
profitable opportunities in spreading their supply chain across a wide set of countries 
through the off-shoring of activities. From these offshore plants firms source goods 
and services for further processing or distribution in the home country, or other 
countries where they established nodes of their supply network. In this paper we 
showed the importance of international sourcing as a competitive weapon to survive 
in a globalizing industry. It can be reconciled with the finding that sourcing cannot be 
held directly responsible for the losses of employment observed in many 
industrialized economies (see e.g. Mankiw and Swagel, 2005). On the contrary, where 
global competition grows and no off-shoring of activities or international outsourcing 
occurs, firms are more likely to exit and/or to substantially lay-off workers. Firms that 
are able to upgrade their domestic activities and benefit from global sourcing cannot 
only survive but can also be expected to create new jobs. Not only domestic firms, but 
also subsidiaries of multinational firms that do not source from abroad and do not use 
their operating flexibility to improve their cost efficiency, are more likely to cease 
operations. The finding that multinational firms have to specialize their production 
processes through increased sourcing of sideline or less cost efficient activities, 
reflects the increased importance of vertical foreign direct investment and 
international fragmentation of production in the last decade. 
In this paper we emphasized the different sources of global competition which 
discipline the behavior of domestic firms. First, the results indicate a strong effect of 
imports originating from low-wage countries. This result corroborates the findings on 
firm exit from U.S. industries presented by Bernard, Jensen and Schott (2006a). 
However, we found the effect to be particularly strong for industries where there is 
less intra-industry trade, implying less product differentiation, or fewer possibilities to 
fragment the production chain in those industries. The result suggests the importance 
of upgrading of activities, using more skilled labor, in industries heavily exposed to 
trade pressure from low-wage countries. An interesting byproduct of our research is 
also the insignificance of the exporting variable in our estimation results.  
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The results suggest that firms subject to strong competitive discipline from 
global competition will have to become more efficient and as a result will become 
exporters, and not the other way around, as it has often been suggested in the 
literature.  
Second, the results also indicate that the growing penetration of multinational 
firms exerts a strong competitive and displacement effect with respect to domestic 
firms in Belgian manufacturing. Subsidiaries of multinational firms do indeed show a 
superior competitive performance vis-à-vis domestic firms. This finding does not 
exclude the possibility that over time new growth opportunities and positive spillover 
effects from MNE subsidiaries to domestic firms could materialize. Görg and Strobl 
(2002, 2003b) found for the rapidly developing high-tech industries of Ireland that 
competitive displacement effects are overcompensated by positive technological 
spillovers. In view of this, it is important that domestic firms are continuously 
challenged and offered the right incentives to participate in global networks and 
possibly internalize such benefits. We also found subsidiaries of multinational firms 
not to be sensitive to local market demand and competitive conditions in Belgium. 
Observing that those subsidiaries operate on relevant markets that are much wider and 
most often encompass the European market, those firms are also less rooted in 
Belgium, and as a result take more flexible exit decisions comparing location 
conditions in different countries on a more continuous basis.  
We believe that all those different results have some important implications 
for economic policies trying to cope with possible undesirable effects of globalization. 
First of all, growing global competition will continue to lead to strong restructuring 
within and across industries. Institutions assisting the functioning of input markets, 
especially labor markets, should therefore adapt themselves to ensure that the 
reallocation of resources to new activities can smoothly happen. Secondly, 
competitive effects from increasing presence of multinational firms should be 
mitigated or compensated by stimulating domestic firms to strongly invest in research 
and development and human capital formation to improve their technological 
capabilities, which may also help them to better compete and absorb technological 
spillovers originating from those multinational firms. Third, the best defense against 
the negative effects of globalization appears to lie in adopting offensive strategies and 
exploiting new possibilities in globalizing industries.  
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From a policy point of view, this implies that firms should not be regarded as 
national champions, but stimulated to better exploit the opportunities accruing from 
the globalization process in spreading their activities and/or source goods and services 
from different regions of the world. While most of the above recommendations may 
sound familiar to the better performing economies in the world, for many continental 
EU countries the implementation of such policies would still mean a radical change 
from traditional industrial policies.  
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APPENDIX A 
DATA SOURCES 
 
TABLE 1 
Definition of Explanatory Variables and data source 
Variable Definition 
TFP Total Factor Productivity (year=1998), calculated following the method described 
in appendix B. Cost shares of inputs, made available by the National Bank, are 
derived from their Company Data Base, “Centrale des Bilans”(CDB). The 
methodology for estimating user cost of capital is explained in Butzen, Fuzz and 
Vermeulen (2002). micro-level firm data, pp. 5-36 
SIZE The logarithm of the reported number of employees (year =1998). Source: CDB 
CAPINT The logarithm of the ratio of physical fixed assets (measured in 1.000 euro) to 
employment (year=1998).Source: CDB 
AGE The number of years the firm has been active in the industry. Source CDB 
DOWNS The percentage decline in the number of employees in the period 1996-1998 
Source: CDB 
INDGROW The relative growth in sales in the industry over the period 1996-1998. 
Source: NACE 3-digit industry data , VAT data, National Bank of Belgium 
ENTRY The ratio of new firms to the number of active firms, averaged over the period 
1996-1998. Source CDB 
EXP Dummy variable indicating that the firm is exporting goods (year= 1998). Source: 
Statitics department of the National bank of Belgium, made available on special 
request. 
SOURC Dummy variable indicating that the firm is importing goods from abroad (year= 
1998). Source: Statitics department of the National bank of Belgium, made 
available on special request.  
SOURCEX Dummy variable indicating that the firm is importing goods from countries 
outside the EU-15 (year=1998). Source: Statitics department of the National bank 
of Belgium, made available on special request. 
MNEPEN The percentage growth in total sales of affiliates of multinational firms over the 
period 1996-1998 per NACE 3-digit industry. 
Ownership data : Federal Planning Bureau . Sales data: CDB . 
IMPGROW The percentage growth in total imports to total sales ratio over the period 1996-
1998 per NACE 3-digit industry. Source: Trade data, National Bank of Belgium 
IMPGROW-L The percentage growth in imports from low-wage countries to total sales ratio per 
NACE 3-digit industry over the period 1996-1998. Source: Trade data, National 
Bank of Belgium. The list of low-wage countries is based on Falk and Wolfmayr 
(2005). The list excludes all high-income countries classified as such by the World 
Bank Datastatistics (2006). 
IMPGROW-H The percentage growth in imports from high-wage countries to total sales ratio per 
NACE 3-digit industry over the period 1996-1998. Source: Trade data, National 
Bank of Belgium.  
IMPGROW-L-D The percentage growth in imports from low-wage countries to total sales ratio 
over the period 1996-1998 per NACE 3-digit highly differentiated industry where 
intra-industry trade represents more than 75% of total trade of the industry. Intra-
industry trade is measured according to the Grubel and Lloyd-index (1975). The 
Grubel-Lloyd index measures the share of imports or exports (whichever is 
smallest) that is ‘covered’ by exports and imports of similar types of goods. 
Source: Trade data, National Bank of Belgium. 
IMPGROW-L-U The percentage growth in imports from low-wage countries to total sales ratio 
over the period 1996-1998 per NACE 3-digit less differentiated industry.  
Source: Trade data, National Bank of Belgium 
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TABLE 2 
Industry Variables - Descriptive Statistics 
Variable        Mean  (St.Dev.) 
INDGROW 0,24  (1,23) 
  
ENTRY 0,04  (0,03) 
  
MNEPEN 0,13  (0,52) 
  
IMPGROW-L 0,56  (0,51) 
  
IMPGROW-H 0,11  (0,39) 
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TABLE 3 
Firm Variables - Descriptive Statistics  
Variable Domestic Firms 
 
 Mean  (St.Dev.) 
Subsidiaries of 
Multinational Firms 
Mean (St.Dev.) 
Significance level 
Differences in means 
Pr > |t| 
TFP 5,38  (0,65) 5,73  (0,65) <.01 
    
SIZE 1,97  (1,14) 4,09   (1,58) <.0001 
    
CAPINT 3,13   (1,52) 3,31   (1,37) <.01 
    
AGE 2,61  (0,69) 2,87  (0,68) <.01 
    
DOWNS 0,07  (0,18) 0,05   (0,14) <.01 
    
EXP 0,28  (0,45) 0,77   (0,42) <.0001 
    
SOURC 0,28  (0,45) 0,84   (0,39) <.0001 
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TABLE 4 
Results from the Logit regression of Domestic Firms’ exit 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
INTERCEPT 3,81*** (17,41) 3,80*** (17,35) 3,88***  (17,46) 3,94***  (19,97) 
  
0,63 0,63 0,64 0,65 
TFP -0,58*** (-16,9) -0,58*** (-19,3) -0,59*** (-17,1) -0,59*** (-17,4) 
  
-0,09 -0,09 -0,09 -0,09 
SIZE        -0,63*** (-22,1) -0,64*** (-22,5) -0,63*** (-22,1) -0,65*** (-24,7) 
  
-0,10 -0,10 -0,10 -0,10 
CAPINT     -0,21*** (-13,9) -0,21*** (-13,9) -0,21*** (-14,0) -0,22*** (-14,7) 
 
-0,03 -0,03 -0,03 -0,03 
AGE -0,02** (-2,28) -0,02** (-2,20) -0,02** (-2,16) -0,02** (-2,21) 
  
-0,003 -0,003 -0,003 -0,003 
AGE2  0,0005* (1,93) 0,0004* (1,81) 0,0004* (1,81) 0,0005* (1,88) 
  
  
  
DOWNS  1,24*** (10,6) 1,22*** (11,1) 1,23*** (10,6) 1,22*** (10,5) 
  
0,20 0,20 0,20 0,20 
INDGROW   - 0,77*** (-4,78) - 0,91*** (-5,17) - 0,93*** (-5,38) - 0,96*** (-6,85) 
  
-0,13 -0,15 -0,15 -0,16 
ENTRY     0,59*** (4,46) 0,61*** (4,63) 0,55*** (3,75) 0,58*** (4,51) 
  
0,09 0,10 0,09 0,09 
EXP 0,007 (0,11) 0,002 (0,04) 0,006  (0,13) -0,25**  (-2,22) 
 
0,001 0,0003 0,001 -0,04 
MNEPEN   0,53*** (2,92) 0,47**  (2,53) 0,38**  (2,18)  
 
0,08 0,08 0,06  
SOURC     -0,16** (-2,41) -0,07  (-1,01) -0,07 (-0,91)  
 
-0,02 -0,01 -0,01  
SOURCEX    -0,41*** (-3,26) -0,42*** (-3,31)  
 
 
-0,07 -0,07  
IMPGROW 0,21** (2,02)    
 
0,03 
 
  
IMPGROW-L  0,48*** (2,81)   
 
 0,08   
IMPGROW-H  0,002 (0,015) -0,03  (-0,22)  
 
 0,0003 -0,005  
IMPGROW-L-D   -0,02  (-0,18)  
  
 
 
-0,003  
IMPGROW-L-U   0,71*** (3,51)  
 
 
 
0,12  
 
 
 
  
Log Lik 
- 6336 - 6328 - 6323 - 6351 
 
 
-  t-values are between brackets, 
- *significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level, 
-  mean marginal effects are in italics 
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TABLE 5 
Results from the Logit regression of MNE subsidiaries’ exit  
 (1) (2) (3) 
INTERCEPT 0,62 (0,74) 0,59 (0,71) 0,67 (0,81) 
  
0,05 0,05 0,06 
TFP -0,30** (-2,51) -0,30** (-2,50) -0,31** (-2,56) 
  
-0,02 -0,02 -0,02 
SIZE        -0,05 (-0,76) -0,05 (-0,75) -0,05 (-0,78) 
  
-0,004 -0,004 -0,004 
CAPINT     -0,03 (-0,53) -0,03 (-0,48) -0,03 (-0,52) 
 
-0,002 -0,002 -0,002 
AGE -0,007 (-0,16) -0,007 (-0,15) -0,007 (-0,16) 
  
-0,0005 -0,0005 -0,0005 
AGE2  0,0002 (0,22) 0,0002 (0,21) 0,0002 (0,21) 
  
   
DOWNS  1,31** (2,43) 1,30** (2,42) 1,33** (2,47) 
  
0,11 0,11 0,11 
INDGROW   0,06 (0,05) 0,01 (0,01) 0,001 (0,01) 
  
0,005 0,0008 0,00008 
ENTRY     -0,24 (-0,63) -0,23 (-0,58) -0,26 (-0,66) 
  
-0,02 -0,02 -0,02 
EXP -0,11 (-0,48) -0,12 (-0,50) -0,10 (-0,43) 
 
-0,01 -0,01 -0,01 
MNEPEN   -0,91 (-1,17) -1,01 (-1,26) -1,08 (-1,31) 
 
-0,08 -0,08 -0,09 
SOURC     -0,95*** (-3,61) -0,94*** (-3,49) -0,93*** (-3,44) 
 
-0,08 -0,08 -0,08 
SOURCEX    -0,12 (-0,24) -0,14 (-0,28) 
 
 -0,01 -0,01 
IMPGROW 0,71** (1,98)   
 
0,06 
  
IMPGROW-L  0,98* (1,72)  
 
 0,08  
IMPGROW-H  0,56 (1,23) 0,57 (1,24) 
 
 0,05 0,05 
IMPGROW-L-D   0,55 (0,51) 
  
 
 0,05 
IMPGROW-L-U   1,16* (1,89) 
 
 
 0,10 
 
 
  
Log Lik 
-478 -469 -462 
 
 
-  t-values are between brackets, 
- *significant at the 10% level; ** significant at the 5% level; *** significant at the 1% level, 
-  mean marginal effects are in italics 
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TABLE A1 
Correlation Matrix of Industry variables 
 
 INDGROW ENTRY MNEPEN IMPGROW-L IMPGROW-H IMPGROW-L-D IMPGROW-L-U 
INDGROW 1       
ENTRY 
-0,22 1      
MNEPEN 
-0,05 -0,11 1     
IMPGROW-L 
-0,08 -0,04 0,25 1    
IMPGROW-H 
-0,55 -0,06 0,12 0,16 1   
IMPGROW-L-D 
-0,07 -0,17 -0,03 0,50 0,03 1  
IMPGROW-L-U 
-0,04 0,08 0,31 0,80 0,17 -0,10 1 
 
       
 
 
 
TABLE A2 
 
Correlation Matrix of Firm variables for Domestic Firms  
 
 TFP SIZE CAPINT AGE DOWNS EXP SOURC SOURCEX 
TFP 1        
SIZE 
-0,05 1       
CAPINT 0,07 -0,27 1      
AGE 0,005 0,27 -0,12 1     
DOWNS 0,17 -0,23 0,14 0,01 1    
EXP 0,11 0,37 0,004 0,15 -0,04 1   
SOURC 0,15 0,51 0,02 0,16 -0,07 0,54 1  
SOURCEX 0,04 0,09 0,01 0,04 -0,02 0,16 0,37 1 
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TABLE A3 
Correlation Matrix of Firm variables for Subsidiaries of Multinational Firms  
 
 TFP SIZE CAPINT AGE DOWNS EXP SOURC SOURCEX 
TFP 1        
SIZE 
-0,07 1       
CAPINT 0,01 -0,07 1      
AGE 0,05 0,26 -0,09 1     
DOWNS 0,28 -0,25 0,15 0,03 1    
EXP 0,08 0,36 0,07 0,13 -0,05 1   
SOURC 0,06 0,36 0,04 0,10 -0,05 0,43 1  
SOURCEX 
-0,008 -0,17 -0,01 -0,04 0,02 -0,06 0,24 1 
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APPENDIX B 
Calculation of TFP 
 
To analyze firm productivity, total factor productivity is calculated following 
the methodology developed by Caves et al. (1982) and used in Aw et al. (2003). The 
methodology consists of constructing an index of productivity, whereby for each firm 
i the logarithm of the levels of output Y and inputs X are compared to those of a 
hypothetical firm, the reference point, whose input and output values take the 
arithmetic mean values of log output, log input, and the respective input cost shares 
over all firms in the industry in a specific year. Hence, a non-parametrically calculated 
TFP index is obtained for each firm, which represents the relative productivity of the 
firm in its industry.  
 
( )( )





−+−−= ∑
j
jjijjiii XXYYTFP lnln2
1)ln(lnln
,,
αα    
with j=[1,n] for the n inputs.  
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FIGURE 1 
Evolution of employment in Belgian manufacturing, import intensity and inward 
FDI stock as percentage of GDP (1970-2002; year 1970=100).  
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Source: Federal Planning Bureau, Eurostat, NBB 
 
